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The Limits of Judicial Review in
Constitutional Adjudication
I. INTRODUCTION
Constitutional adjudication presently requires that in order for
a party to challenge a governmental act he must claim that the act
has violated his constitutional rights. The purpose of this Article is
to show that such a requirement undermines constitutional limits
on governmental actions and is inconsistent with a proper inter-
pretation of the Constitution.
Properly understood, the Constitution is a grant of power rather
than a limitation on power. This grant of power rests upon two
fundamental concepts: first, because the ultimate power rests with
the people rather than the government, all governmental power is
delegated power; and second, this grant of power is limited td secu-
lar concerns and does not include authority over religious or pri-
vate matters.
The revolutionary basis of the United States Constitution is
popular sovereignty and secular government. At the time of the
framing of the Constitution, no other government rested on such
principles. The body of the Constitution distributes legitimate
powers of government among the branches of the federal govern-
ment as well as to the states. Moreover, specific provisions in the
Constitution limit the means by which those powers are to be ex-
ercised. Chief Justice Marshall articulated this point in McCulloch
v. Maryland' by stating, "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within
the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate,
which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited,
but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are
constitutional." 2
Marshall recognized that the legitimate objectives of govern-
ment cannot be defined in terms of the prohibitions found in the
* B.A., J.D., University of Chicago. Former Dean, University of Puget Sound
School of Law. Professor, University of Puget Sound School of Law.
** B.A., M.A., University of Nebraska, J.D., University of Wisconsin.
1. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 421 (1819).
2. Id.
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Bill of Rights, but must be defined according to generally accepted
legitimate powers of government and the delegation of those pow-
ers to specific agencies of government. The problem is to define
the legitimate objectives of government and to develop a mecha-
nism that will limit the government to those objectives.
Delegations of authority have long existed in the law of agency.
When a principal grants authority to his agent, the agent's author-
ity is limited to those acts which are necessary to achieve the pur-
pose of the agency relationship. Hence, even when the principal
instructs the agent to do "as sufficiently as we ourselves could do
personally," the agent's authority does not extend beyond the rela-
tionship contemplated by the parties. 3 Implicit in such a relation-
ship is the understanding that the agent will not disobey orders
and that his authority may increase or diminish in accordance with
changing circumstances. 4 Furthermore, custom, reasonable expec-
tations of the parties, as well as the wishes of the principal define
the scope of the agent's authority.5 Finally, both parties under-
stand that acts of the agent are for the general benefit of the princi-
pal and that the authority granted includes the authority to act
mistakenly or beyond the powers specifically granted.6
Although this approach is clearly understood in private law7 as
well as in local governmental law,8 great confusion exists as to its
application to Congress or to state legislatures. 9 In the case of lo-
cal government, neither the commissioners of a drainage district
nor a city council could pass legislation which was not related to
3. W. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 21, at 37 (1964).
4. Id. at 38.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 39.
7. "An agent may have power to create relationships between... [this] princi-
pal and a third person because of authority, apparent authority, estoppel, or
inherent agency power." Id. § 8, at 11.
8. Of course the law varies somewhat. For example, in tort law, except where
governmental immunity interferes, the local government, like a private cor-
poration, is under the rule of respondeat superior. On the other hand, such
entities are more restricted in their authority to contractually bind the partic-
ular government, and all taxpayers have standing to sue to prevent the im-
proper expenditure of funds. See, e.g., Baltimore Retail Liquor Package
Stores Ass'n v. Kerngood, 171 Md. 426, 189 A. 209 (1937); Boryszewski v.
Brydges, 37 N.Y.2d 361, 334 N.E.2d 579, 372 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1975). See also Ru-
dolph & Rudolph, Standing: A Legal Process Approach, 36 S.W.LJ. 857, 878-79
(1982).
9. Where the purposes are more general, questions arise as to the distinction
between public, as opposed to private purpose, and as to the proper scope of
authority granted. The problem is compounded by the doctrine of sovereign
immunity; by the doctrine that governments are not bound by their agents
mistakes of law, Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947); and by
the limitation on standing that allows one to object when a governmental en-
tity injures his property rights, but not when it injures his political rights.
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the purposes of carrying out drainage district business or the
proper business of the municipality. In regard to legislative bodies
with general lawmaking authority, however, confusion exists. This
is because of our British heritage and our failure to understand the
crucial differences between the Constitution of the United States
and the British Constitution.
Unlike the Constitution of the United States, the British Consti-
tution does not delegate authority to the government. Further-
more, the English sovereign was the King rather than the people.10
As sovereign, the King was the source of law. Only grants of im-
munity or concessions could limit his power.l" Hence, from the
Magna Carta to the Bill of Rights in 1689, all rights of Englishmen
were derived from sovereign grants.' 2 Even the Whig concept of
popular sovereignty, consecrated in the preamble to the United
States Constitution, existed as a fiction in English law, because
from the time of the Bill of Rights in 1689, the King could act only
through his cabinet, and the cabinet was responsible to Parlia-
ment.' 3 The concept of the unified sovereign continued even
though effective control shifted to the people through their repre-
sentatives in Parliament. And because the fiction required govern-
ment ministers to be agents of the King, no constitutional
limitations existed on governmental power. Furthermore, since
grants of rights to the people were grants from the King with the
concurrence of Parliament, no restrictions existed on the power of
the King in Parliament.
Thomas Hutchinson, Governor of Massachusetts and the lead-
ing Tory spokesman of the time, did not take the position that Par-
liament lacked the power to tax the Colonies. Instead, he argued
that Parliament should limit the use of that power.' 4 The revolu-
10. See, T. HOBBES, LEvIATHAN (1950); A. RAMSAY, THOUGHTS ON THE ORIGINAL
NATURE OF GOVERNMENT chpt. XVIII "Of Commonwealth" (1769).
The only limitation on sovereign power recognized by Hobbes and other
monarchists like Filmer is the artificial limit that one has no duty to kill him-
self. T. HOBBES, supra, at 184.
11. Calvin's Case (The Case of the Postnati), Howells State Trials, 6 James I, 559
(1608): Lord Ellesmere, 'The monarch is the law. Rex est lex loquens" (The
King is the law speaking). Id. at 693.
12. The Charter was a grant of power from the King to his various subjects. The
power was in the King to grant or withhold such liberties as were mentioned
in the Charter.
13. In order to reconcile the Hobbesian concept of an undivided sovereignty with
democratic control, the British have built a fiction around the crown. Thus
the King, like a corporation, can only act through his agents or ministers.
Furthermore, his ministers are responsible not to him but to an elected Par-
liament. In this way the sovereignty is unified in the King while remaining
subject to the complete control of Parliament.
14. One commentator described Hutchinson's philosophy as follows:
[Vol. 63:84
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tionists' position was twofold: first, taxation, an undoubted power
of government, could be exercised only if the parties to be taxed
were represented in the body which levied the taxes; and second,
all other governmental powers were limited to the purposes for
which they were granted and furthermore had to be exercised for
the benefit of the people.15
At the time of the revolution, none of the colonies exercised
sovereign power. The colonies resembled municipalities rather
than present-day states in that they exercised police power and
the power to pass bylaws. However, they did not have full legisla-
tive power. Provincial laws could therefore be challenged as in-
consistent with common-law rules or parliamentary acts.' 6
When the colonies declared their independence, the King's sov-
ereignty devolved upon the people of the United States. In the
Declaration of Independence, the representatives of the United
States proclaimed: "We, therefore, the Representatives of the
United States of America,. . . do, in the Name, and by Authority of
the good People of these Colonies, solemnly Publish and Declare,
That these United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be, Free and
Independent States; . ..-'1 The signers of the Declaration truly
believed that they represented the people and that the grievances
listed were violations of the people's rights rather than infringe-
ments upon the rights of government. Under the logic of the Dec-
laration, the people, not the states or the national government,
became sovereign in the United States.
Similarly, the emphasis in the Constitution is on the sover-
eignty of the people. The preamble sets out the purposes of gov-
ernment: "to . . .establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility,
provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and
secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity."18
Three of these purposes are carry-overs from the Articles of Con-
federation which had provided for a common defense, security of
Absolute, supreme authority, for Hutchison, was neither good nor
bad, neither a desirable nor an undesirable thing: it simply was...
in the case of Britain, that power, marvelously restricted by balances
of "mixed" government, was entrusted to Parliament in its totality,
but is, to King, Lords and Commons operating together as sovereign.
B. BAILYN, THE ORDEAL OF THOMAS HUTCHINSON (1965).
15. J. DICKINSON, LETTERS FROM A FARMER IN PENNSYLVANIA (1903).
16. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *108-09 (reference to Statutes of the Realm,
7 & 8, Will. III, c. 22). For a general discussion of the Privy Council and the
Board of Trade, see A. KELLY &.W. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTrrUION
48-54 (5th ed. 1976); 2 C. STEPHENSON & F. MARCHAM, SOURCES OF ENGLISH
CONSTTUTIONAL HISTORY 590-92 (1972) (reference to Records Concerning Col-
onies (1660-81)).
17. The Declaration of Independence para 32 (U.S. 1776).
18. U.S. CONST. preamble.
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liberties, and general welfare. Justice and domestic tranquility
were added because the major grievance against the confederacy
was that property rights and domestic order were left to local con-
trol. The Constitution also established a court system and im-
posed a duty to ensure the republican form of government.
Promoting general welfare is essentially a broad grant of authority;
however, it does embody two major restrictions: first, Congress
must legislate generally for all of the states as opposed to specifi-
cally for a particular state, and second, such legislation must fur-
ther the general good rather than the good of a particular
individual.19 These restrictions embody the agency principles
mentioned above, i.e., that in the exercise of delegated powers, the
agent must act for the benefit of the principal.
The main thrust of the Constitution is that the people have del-
egated powers to agents called representatives who must rule for
the benefit of the people. Hence, the purpose of government is to
ensure life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness to the sovereign
people. Accordingly, the functions of government are limited to
that end. In the case of the federal government, the functions are
further limited in order to permit diversity at the state level.20
Recognizing that all governmental powers are delegated clari-
fies Hamilton's comments in The Federalist No. 84, concerning the
need for a Bill of Rights:
I go further, and affirm that bills of rights, in the sense and in the extent
in which they are contended for, are not only unnecessary in the proposed
constitution, but would even be dangerous. They would contain various
exceptions to powers which are not granted; and on this very account,
would afford a colourable pretext to claim more than were granted.
2 1
By contrast, those who advocated a Bill of Rights hoped that
clearer limitations might prevent the government from overstep-
ping its bounds. But because the founding fathers feared that by
adopting a Bill of Rights it could be inferred that the government
was sovereign, i.e., that it possessed all rights not specifically pro-
hibited, the ninth and tenth amendments were drafted in order to
ensure that such an inference could not be drawn. The ninth
amendment is especially instructive: "The enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people."22
The problem, of course, is that one has no way of knowing what
19. Northwest Territory Ordinance of 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 51, 52.
20. One basic right reserved to the people is the right to elect and control their
local government. See Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 102
S. Ct. 2126 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
21. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 579 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
22. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
[Vol. 63:84
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these rights are unless one has a theory of what powers are dele-
gated. It may be assumed that the stated prohibitions in the Con-
stitution include rights not delegated, but it is clear that they are
not exclusive. The issue, then, is to determine what powers the
people have granted to their government.
The first and most basic power that any society grants to its
government is the police power. the power to declare law, main-
tain order, and when necessary, to suppress evils that threaten
public, as opposed to private, interests. A second power that any
society grants to its government is the authority to regulate rela-
tionships among private individuals. Such regulation occurs either
when a court determines the rights and duties of individuals or
when a legislature enacts statutes. A third power granted to gov-
ernment is the power to direct its own operations. This power may
be viewed as part of the police power but is distinguishable in that
it does not directly affect private rights as defined by the law decla-
ration function or as regulated by the police functions. The last
power granted is the economic regulatory power. This power dif-
fers from the police power in that its purpose is not to suppress
evils but rather to promote the general welfare by measures which
private individuals cannot accomplish or are needed by the com-
munity as a whole rather than by individuals. This power includes
the authority to develop an infrastructure. Since each power
arises from different societal needs and since the scope and proper
exercise of each power differs, each power must be discussed sepa-
rately. In that way, one will understand how the judiciary can en-
sure that each power is exercised for its proper purpose.
II. THE POLICE POWER
The police power protects the interests of the community. It
protects the community's health, safety, and welfare rather than
particular property interests of its members. At times, the public
interest may coincide with private interests, but it may also be con-
trary to those interests. The police power differs from the law of
governmental administration or operations in as much as the latter
regulates the internal operations of government. The police power
also differs from the law declaration power which defines the legal
relationships between private parties. In some respects, the police
power may resemble the economic regulatory power. However,
the difference is that the police power protects health, safety, and
welfare whereas the economic regulatory power sets terms and
conditions of trade.
The need for the police power arises from the structure of soci-
ety, and by its very nature limits private rights. Societies, there-
fore, have sought to control the exercise of that power. According
1983]
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to Hobbes, the purpose of the police power was to prevent a war of
all against all. 23 The establishment of a police power allowed soci-
eties to protect themselves against foreign enemies as well as to
maintain domestic order. Order came, however, at the cost of lib-
erty. In England, for example, Henry II established order through
the King's peace and the creation of a common law.24 For five hun-
dred years thereafter, the English sought a means of controlling
the peace-keeping power of their kings so that an effective power
could be combined with liberty.25
The United States Constitution was an attempt to solidify a
combination of liberty and order in a method of government that
would ensure popular sovereignty as well. The continuing experi-
ment is our constitutional law. By examining the police power and
its interrelationship with the other powers of government, we may
be able to explain the functioning of the courts within this
structure.
One thesis is that the limitations on the operation of govern-
mental power are ascertained by construing the extent of the pow-
ers granted to the government rather than by referring to the
specific prohibitions found in the first eight amendments. Except
for the first amendment, the Bill of Rights is essentially a restate-
ment of the common law and statutory limitations which were
placed on the King's exercise of the police power. Hence, no speci-
fications concerning the matters subject to the police power exist
in the Bill of Rights. Instead, the Bill of Rights relates essentially
to traditional procedures required when applying the police power
to individual cases. For example, the power to search is subject to
judicial review on the basis of reasonableness. The initiation of
the criminal process is subject to the requirement of a grand jury.
And the procedure in a criminal case is subject to the requirement
of a trial by jury. Private rights are protected from extinction by
the requirement that legislatively adopted procedures must be fol-
lowed. Hence, state of siege military tribunals and executive con-
trolled courts are prohibited. The drafters of the Constitution did
not bother to state these restrictions because they were an ac-
23. T. HOBBES, supra note 10, at 143-44.
And in him [Leviathan] consisteth the essence of the Common
wealth; which (to define it,) is One Person, of whose Acts a great Mul-
titude, by mutual Covenants one with another, have made themselves
every one the Author, to the end he may use the strength and means of
them all, as he shall think expedient for their Peace and Common
Defence.
Id.
24. 1 C. STEPHENSON & F. MA cHAM, supra note 16, at 73-80 (reference to the Con-
stitutions of Clarendon (1164) and the Assize of Clarendon (1166)).
25. 2 Id. at 599-605 (reference to Bill of Rights (1689), Statutes of the Realm, VI,
142 f.: I William & Mary, st. 2, c. 2).
[Vol. 63:84
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cepted part of English law operating at that time in the colonies.2 6
In contrast, where personal rights were claimed rather than estab-
lished, specific provisions were set out in the body of the Constitu-
tion. As Hamilton stated in The Federalist No. 84, the Constitution,
without the amendments, is in fact a bill of rights. 2 7 Furthermore,
the separation of powers is clearly a procedural attempt to limit
the abuse of the police power. Thus, Congress cannot attain;
judges have life tenure and are therefore less subject to influence;
and numerous barriers separate the executive and the legislative
branches.
The procedure for applying the police power is thus guaranteed
by the common law, statutes, and the Constitution. However,
neither the subject matter nor a statement of who should exercise
the police power is resolved by this analysis. Historically, the po-
lice power was a function of the executive. Since the police power
is the community acting on its own behalf to solve problems that
arise, the community naturally recognized that power as belonging
to the executive. 28 In the beginning, community interests were be-
lieved to be in the King.29 But since no method existed to ensure
that the King actually perceived the community's interests apart
from his own, the authority to determine the scope of the police
power was transferred to the legislative branch. The decision to
exercise that power, however, remained in the executive or was
assigned to various administrative agencies or subordinate legisla-
tive bodies.
The executive's right to invoke the police power is defined by
26. 1 Id. at 450-52 (reference to Petition of Right (1628), Statute of Realm, V. 23 f.).
27. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 581 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
28. E. FREUND, LEGISLAT vE REGULATION ch. II, 18-19 (1932):
For England, the difference between the two types of legislation has
found expression in Chief Baron Fleming's argument in Bate's case
(1606; quoted in Prothero's Statutes and Constitutional Documents,
p. 341; also in my Police Power, p.6). The substance of the statement
is as follows: A distinction should be made between an ordinary and
an absolute power of the king. The ordinary power is for the execu-
tion of civil justice; it is exercised by equity and justice in ordinary
courts, and is designated by the civilians as jus privatum, and in
England as common law. This law cannot be changed without Parlia-
ment; indeed, it can never be changed altogether in substance, al-
though its form and course may be changed and interpreted. The
king's absolute power is concerned with the general benefit of the
people; it is most properly named policy and government, and is not
guided by the rules which direct the common law only; and as the
constitution of the body of the people varies from time to time, so
changes the absolute law, according to the wisdom of the king for the






emergency or by statute. The exercise of the police power can be
judicially circumscribed by reviewing whether in fact an emer-
gency existed or by determining whether the executive acted
within the legislative grant of power. When asked to do so by the
persons affected, courts have no difficulty reviewing these exer-
cises of power. The question for the court is whether the executive
was indeed granted the power by the legislature or whether the
emergency was of such urgency as to require the particular action.
Since the executive has no inherent power to determine the
subject matter of the police power even in emergency situations,
its power to act in an emergency arises because the community,
through its representatives, has not had time to consider the mat-
ter; or, because the emergency requires immediate action. In such
situations, an exercise of police power which in turn limits private
rights must be tailored to meet the emergency and may exist only
until such time as the legislature has had an opportunity to con-
front the problem. Thus, the courts can legitimately impose the
least drastic means requirement on executive-initiated emergency
police powers. The problem becomes much more difficult when
the legislature determines the subject matter of the police power
and the means necessary to enforce it. Since the legislature is the
representative of the community and the exercise of the power re-
lates to the health, safety, and welfare of the community, one has
difficulty imagining situations in which the community should be
restricted in dealing with its own health, safety, and welfare.
Certainly no one other than the community itself should make
a determination of whether a problem relates to its health, safety,
and welfare. The difficulty, of course, is that the "community" is
an abstraction which acts only through its agents. Hence, the func-
tion of judicial review is not to supplant what the community re-
gards as necessary to its health, safety, and welfare, but rather to
ensure:
(1) that the agents of the community exercise only the powers
granted to them;
(2) that the agents of the community act in the community's
interest rather than their own; and
(3) that the agents of the community act in the interest of the
whole community rather than in the interest of special sectors.
Each of the above points will be discussed in the following anal-
ysis, beginning with a review of the inherent limitations on the en-
forcement of the community's powers. Next we will analyze the
conflicts of interest which arise between the community as princi-
pal and its agents. Finally, we will examine the problem of special
interests. Each of these conflicts give rise to traditional problems
of judicial review. Their resolution in a constitutional framework
[Vol. 63:84
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corresponds to a traditional review of the actions of trustees or cor-
porate directors.
Two characteristics of the American community limit matters
subject to the police power. The first is the fact that American so-
ciety is secular in nature so that political or religious issues are
beyond societal control. By contrast, most societies have at some
time exerted some control over political and religious beliefs. At
the time of the adoption of the United States Constitution, the
English believed that society could appropriately enforce certain
beliefs in the name of community health, safety, and welfare.30
But in American society, at least on the national level, it was clear
even without the first amendment that Congress had no power to
enforce a similar orthodoxy, even if the community believed that
enforcement would promote public peace and harmony.31 This
limitation goes even further. Since society is secular and the po-
lice power involves only issues affecting the community, many
areas of personal activity and thought cannot be properly under-
stood as involving the community unless the community claims
authority over private matters and morals. The claims of the com-
munity over such private activity have always been based on the
right of the community to protect its religious values. Thus, once
religious values were freed from community control, traditional
community control over private matters and morals was without
foundation in the police power. It is this limitation on the police
power, rather than an undefinable claim to fundamental rights,
that led the Court to its decisions in Griswold v. Connecticut,3 2 Ei-
senstadt v. Baird33 and Roe v. Wade.34
In each of these cases, the underlying rationale of the regula-
tory statute was to prevent private immorality. Such statutes were
a result of the anti-contraceptive Comstock movement of the late
1800's. 35 By the mid-twentieth century, however, the courts recog-
nized that not only was the federal government secular, but that at
least since the Civil War, state governments were also essentially
secular. Hence, the courts began to strike down exercises of police
power in areas that were essentially private. The question before
30. The Bill of Rights of 1689 provided for a protestant succession and required
all office holders to swear fealty to that protestant succession. 2 C. STEPHEN-
SON & F. MARcHAM, supra note 16, at 599-605 (reference to Bill of Rights
(1689), Statutes of the Realm, VI, 142 f.: I William & Mary, St. 2, c. 2).
31. Compare U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 3 (oath provision of U.S. Constitution); 2 C.
STEPHENSON & F. MARcHAM, supra note 16 at 599-605 (oath provision of Bill of
Rights).
32. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
33. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
34. 410 U.S. 113, reh'g denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973).
35. D. BENNETT, ANTHONY CoMsTocK: HIS CAREER OF CRUELTY AND CRIME (1971).
1983]
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the Supreme Court in each of the cases previously cited was
whether a secular police purpose was furthered by the statute. In
each instance, the Court could find none. As a result, the Court
determined that such legislation violated fundamental rights.
In terms of constitutional rights, the Goldberg concurrence in
Griswold came closest to the mark. Relying on the ninth amend-
ment, Justice Goldberg recognized that all police regulations in-
fringe upon private rights and thus must be justified on the
minimum basis that they further some articulated public purpose
which is legitimate in a secular society.36
The requirement that a constitutional rather than a private
right must exist arose simply because the Court assumed that
Congress could do anything that was not specifically prohibited.
Thus, in Griswold, the Court was forced to deal with Justice
Black's opinion in Ferguson v. Skrupa:37
The doctrine... that due process authorizes courts to hold laws unconsti-
tutional when they believe the legislature has acted unwisely-has long
since been discarded. We have returned to the original constitutional
proposition that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs
for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws.3 8
Justice Black did not mean that the legislature could act beyond
its jurisdiction. In fact his first amendment opinions clearly indi-
cate that legislative power has limits. 39 The issue that Justice
Black posed for the rest of the Court in Griswold was where such
limits were to be found. Justice Black insisted on finding specific
limits in the Bill of Rights40 Justice Harlan wished to continue
with substantive due process;4 1 Justice Douglas looked to the
36. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). "In sum, I believe that the right
of privacy in the marital relation is fundamental and basic-a personal right
'retained by the people' within the meaning of the Ninth Amendment." Id. at
499.
37. 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
38. Id. at 730.
39. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L RaV. 865 (1960) (Justice Black's position
that the first amendment is absolute); see also New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
40. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965): "I like my privacy as well as the
next one, but I am nevertheless compelled to admit that government has a
right to invade it unless prohibited by some specific constitutional provision."
Id. at 510.
41. In my view, the proper constitutional inquiry in this case is whether
this Connecticut statute infringes the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment because the enactment violates basic values
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 325. For reasons stated at length in my dissenting opinion in
Poe v. Ullman, supra, I believe that it does. While the relevant in-
quiry may be aided by resort to one or more of the provisions of the
Bill of Rights, it is not dependent on them or any of their radiations.
[Vol. 63:84
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penumbras of the fourth and fifth amendments;42 and Justice
Goldberg argued that private rights derive from the ninth amend-
ment.4 3 All four justices were fighting on Justice Black's turf and
in terms of his analysis that all power not specifically prohibited to
the government had been granted.
The premise of this Article is that Justice Black's view is com-
pletely inconsistent with the actual structure of the government
and with the concept of a limited secular government based upon
popular sovereignty. If one studies the issues raised in Griswold
and clarified in Eisenstadt, one will recognize that the Court re-
solved those cases based on a determination of whether the partic-
ular statute is a legitimate exercise of a secular state's police
power. In both cases, the Court determined that the legislation
was passed to control private activity in furtherance of a particular
religious view of appropriate behavior and was thus beyond the
police power of a secular state.
This does not mean that a real public harm cannot be limited
because religious groups also consider such acts harmful. What
such a determination does mean is that the police power cannot
reach private actions unless a clear nexus exists between such ac-
tions and a perceived public harm.44 The abortion cases show the
difficulty in drawing such a line. For example, in Roe v. Wade,45
the historical basis for the criminal statute was the anti-contracep-
tive movement of the late nineteenth century. The Court properly
found that use of criminal sanctions to regulate family planning
was beyond the authority of the police power. If one perceives the
holding of Roe to be that under the police power a state cannot
impose criminal sanctions on private activity such as abortion be-
cause the public health, safety, and welfare are not sufficiently im-
plicated, then Roe, as well as later cases, is easily explained.
Under this approach, the Hyde Amendment4 6 was not applicable
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment stands, in
my opinion, on its own bottom.
Id. at 500.
42. "The foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights
have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give
them life and substance." Id. at 484.
43. See supra note 36.
44. '"Their (the legislature's) Power in the utmost Bounds of it, is limited to the
publick [sic] good of the Society. It is a Power, that hath no other end but
preservation, and therefore can never have a right to destroy, enslave, or de-
signedly to impoverish the Subjects." (footnote omitted) J. LocKE, Two
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 375 (1960).
45. 410 U.S. at 113, reh'g denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973).
46. Helms-Hyde Bill, S. 158, HMR. 900, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2, 127 CONG. REC.




in Roe v. Wade,47 because the Amendment was not an exercise of
the police power but of the governmental operations power, since
the Amendment concerned appropriations.
The recognition that it is the power rather than the right which
is at stake is reflected in congressional attempts to reverse Roe v.
Wade. The proposals generally have sought to declare that the fe-
tus is a "person" at conception. Such a determination would allow
the state to utilize its police power to protect fetal "persons" from
outside harm.4 8 Were such a proposal enacted into law and later
challenged in court, the case would not involve a review of the law
declaration power. Instead, the issue would be whether the law
was a good faith exercise of the law declaration power by Con-
gress. The issue of good faith would arise because in matters of
family law, the law declaration function normally rests with the
state rather than the federal government and the only purpose of
such a law would be to permit state police power to reach private
activities.4 9
Since much of family law is derived from the Bible0 and was
enforced in ecclesiastical courts,5 1 the issue arises as to whether a
secular state may properly assume this responsibility without in-
fringing upon the free exercise of religion and without using its
police power for purposes not contemplated by the founders. At
the time of the adoption of the Constitution, Congress clearly did
not have the authority to exert the police power in family matters.
Whether withdrawal of jurisdiction shbuld be imposed upon state
legislatures should be the issue for the courts, not whether some
obscure concept of fundamental rights can be made to work. As
the controversy over abortion indicates, this is certainly a closer
question than the authority of the state to deal with private sexual
activity between married or unmarried people. The requirement
for the state to exercise its power in either case is a close nexus to
a public rather than a private harm.5 2
47. 410 U.S. 113, reh'g denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973).
48. Helms-Hyde Bill, § 1, at S. REP. 287.
49. Even in diversity cases, federal courts do not have jurisdiction over claims
arising from domestic relations disputes. See, e.g., In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586
(1890); Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1859); Korby v. Erickson, 550
F. Supp. 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). Traditionally, the police power is reserved to the
states, especially in criminal matters.
50. Leviticus sets out a rather complete set of rules on appropriate sexual
behavior.
51. 1 C. STEPHENSON & F. MARCHAm, supra note 16, at 304-06 (reference to Act in
Restraint of Appeals (1533), Statutes of the Realm, IIL 427 f.: 24 Henry VI, c.
12).
52. Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982). The issue is whether the
public qua public has a police power interest in interfamily matters, not
whether the court may exercise jurisdiction when disputes arise between
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The remaining limitations on the exercise of the police power
are jurisdictional. As will be evident from an analysis of the law
declaration function, legislatures may not establish statuses, 53 de-
feat legitimate contractual expectations, 54 or use private property
for public purposes without compensating private individuals. 55
Within the proper exercise of the police power, however, classifica-
tions which seem to establish statuses may arise and limitations
on the use of private property may occur. The function of the court
in such cases is to examine whether the alleged authority for the
exercise of the police power is legitimate or whether it was a sub-
terfuge for exercising a power not granted. If the purpose or effect
of a police power regulation is to defeat the reasonable expecta-
tions of the parties or to transfer wealth from one individual to an-
other, it should be found violative of the contracts clause. 56 In the
same manner, if the purpose or effect of a police power regulation
is to transfer wealth from an individual to the public, then the
transfer should be found violative of the just compensation
clause.57
The Constitution does not restrict necessary governmental ac-
tivity but assumes a fundamental fairness in the exercise of public
authority so that no particular persons are benefited at the ex-
pense of others. The problem for the courts in cases involving
these issues is not whether property has been taken without due
process of law, but whether the purpose of the police regulation
accomplishes a legitimate end. Thus, an activity can be prohibited
family members. The bases for decisions settling family disputes are found
in communal values. At a minimum, Roe v. Wade held that no sufficient
"public" interest supports the use of the criminal law. Justice Blackmun's
extended discussion of when life begins is essentially an argument that pro-
tection of the fetus is not a proper object of the police power. The important
question to resolve is whether a danger threatens the health, safety, and wel-
fare of the public if abortions are permitted.
53. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
54. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
55. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
56. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. Thus, in Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus,
438 U.S. 234, reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 886 (1978), the majority emphasis was on
its retrospective application contrary to ERISA which was prospective in ap-
plication. If all that were at issue had been whether an employer could not in
bad faith terminate an employee to avoid pension liability, then the case
clearly would have gone the other way.
57. U.S. CONsT. amend. V. The classic case is the use of the police power to zone
property into parkland. In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926), the Court held that such zoning was a taking. On the other hand, in
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), land used as a brickyard was
rezoned for use as single-family residences. This was held not to be a taking
because the owner of the land was not treated worse than other land owners,
and the new use permitted to the landowner was a reasonable one.
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if the activity is harmful to the public even though private wealth
would be destroyed. Without reference to the general limitations
on the police power, many activities have been properly prohibited
or regulated at great cost to an individual where his actions re-
sulted in a perceived public harm.5 8
In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,5 9 the Court refused to rec-
ognize the justification for an exercise of the police power because
it resulted in a transfer of wealth from a buyer to a seller in viola-
tion of contract provisions. In Mahon, the legislature required
mining companies to leave columns of coal so that the land would
not settle under buildings owned by others. As Justice Brandeis
pointed out in his dissent, such a requirement was a classic use of
the police power.
Every restriction upon the use of property imposed in the exercise of
the police power deprives the owner of some right theretofore enjoyed,
and is, in that sense, an abridgement by the state of rights in property
without making compensation. But restriction imposed to protect the
public health, safety or morals from dangers threatened is not a taking.
The restriction here in question is merely the prohibition of a noxious use.
The property so restricted remains in the possession of its owner. The
state does not appropriate it or make any use of it. The state merely pre-
vents the owner from making a use which interferes with paramount
rights of the public....
The restriction upon the use of this property cannot, of course, be law-
fully imposed, unless its purpose is to protect the public. But the purpose
of a restriction does not cease to be public, because incidentally some pri-
vate persons may thereby receive gratuitously valuable special benefits.
60
Justice Holmes, writing for the majority, disagreed, even though in
prior cases he had taken the position that the Court had no author-
ity to declare police power regulations unconstitutional. 61 In
Mahon, the Court struck down the legislation not because the leg-
islature lacked power to pass a proper police power regulation, but
because the regulation transferred a property interest for which
compensation had already been paid.
The operative fact in the case was Holmes' statement that:
"The deed conveys the surface but in express terms reserves the
right to remove all the coal under the same and the grantee takes
the premises with the risk [of subsiding] and waives all claim for
58. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963), finally destroyed the vested rights
theory. No private right exists which is not subject to some legitimate public
claim. The difficult issues arise only when the public seeks to reach beyond
its normal boundaries on a claim of necessity. In those cases, the court must
examine the legitimacy of the public's claim and determine whether other
means within the public's power could accomplish the purpose. Under this
approach, strict scrutiny is applicable.
59. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
60. Id. at 417-18.
61. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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damages that may arise from mining out the coal."62 Thus, the
purchasers of the surface land had been compensated for the risk
of loss, as was reflected by a lower purchase price. Obviously, the
price would have been higher if a law prohibiting subsidence had
existed at the time of the sale. In the same manner, where the
surface owners are public bodies, they have a right through emi-
nent domain to repurchase the protection granted by the statute.
Under the theory of the case, then, the police power cannot be
used in order to transfer wealth between private parties, or from
private parties to public bodies, even though a similar law applied
prospectively would be upheld.63 The reason for the distinction is
that a transaction after the passage of the police regulation would
reflect the regulation in the consideration given.
Limitations on the exercise of the police power, therefore, are
not found in the loss to the property regulated but in the gain to
the particular private parties or governmental agencies. One may
ask how this transaction differs from a police regulation where a
gain accrues to the public in general. Properly applied, the police
regulation would maximize total wealth by taking into considera-
tion both the individual's loss and the community's gain. The loss
to the individual from the regulation should not be as great as the
gain for the community as a whole, because the police power can-
not be used to transfer wealth from one person to another without
at least a perceived reasonable gain in community wealth. In crim-
inal law, for example, the punishment of the criminal is not based
solely on the loss to the victim but rather on the total cost to the
community in terms of police expenditures, fear, and general
discomfort.64
An example of private loss and public gain is fireworks safety
legislation. Such legislation may benefit the public even though
the companies affected lose money. Emission control legislation
has caused the demise of many racing car manufacturers. Again
the public gain injures private parties, but in all such cases, the
perceived benefit to the public is greater than the private loss.
Such regulations are quite different from legislation that would
favor one group over another simply because that group was politi-
cally more powerful. Although the Court did not resolve the mat-
ter in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,65 what moved Justice
Holmes was clearly the unjust enrichment of the purchasers of the
62. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412.
63. See Kealey Pharmacy & Home Care Serv. v. Walgreen Co., 539 F. Supp. 1357
(W.D. Wis. 1982).
64. See generally Rudolph, Punishment or Cure: The Function of Criminal Law,
48 TENN. L. REv. 535 (1981).
65. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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surface rights at the expense of the coal company and not the re-
strictions on land use. As is apparent from his dissent in Lochner
v. New York, 66 Justice Holmes would have upheld prospective reg-
ulations requiring surface support or prospective regulations re-
quiring coal companies to leave land surfaces as they found
them. 67
The more difficult problem is to determine when the police
power benefits the public through restrictions on private use and
when the power of eminent domain may justifiably be used to take
private property for public use. Clearly, a restriction on private
use which benefits society is proper if measurement of the total
gain takes into account the loss to the individual property owner.
On the other hand, the mere transfer of property to the public does
not increase total wealth, since it simply increases the wealth of
one group at the expense of another. For example, to zone prop-
erty into a park is prohibited because society as a whole is not en-
riched,68 whereas to prohibit a brickyard or rendering plant from
locating in an urban area is not a taking since the total wealth of
the community is thereby increased. Obviously, the state could
abuse its power by first zoning restrictively and then through emi-
nent domain take the property at the valuation for the lesser use.
Normally, courts do not allow such abuses of governmental power.
If a transfer to a public use occurs for purposes that are generally
supplied by government, then the law of eminent domain applies
and the police power cannot be used. On the other hand, if a re-
striction is wealth maximizing for society as a whole, then the po-
lice power may be used.
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,69 the
Court was forced to rule on the legality of governmental restric-
tions on private property. In Penn Central, a landmark preserva-
tion law regulated the modification of buildings which had been
designated as historically significant. If, taking into account any
66. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
67. Id.
68. See Citizens to preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). One
might argue that any transfer from private to public hands is for the benefit of
the public. Such an argument supposes a very narrow definition of the public
since the public qua government exists for the benefit of both the private and
public sectors, and the total wealth of the community includes both private
and public property. Thus, a transfer of property is wealth enhancing only if
it is voluntary, i.e., both parties believe that it is to their interest. This view
does not change merely because one party to the transaction is the public.
The fact that eminent domain may substitute for voluntary exchange does
not invalidate the analysis because this substitute exists solely to prevent
monopoly pricing by the seller where one landowner could hold up a series of
transactions.
69. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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loss to the owner, the preservation of such buildings is wealth
maximizing for society as a whole, then the law should be upheld.
On the other hand, if constructing and maintaining historic monu-
ments is a service that the community should supply, then the law
is simply a transfer of property rights from private to public enti-
ties and should require compensation. Obviously, no legal analy-
sis can provide the answer for all cases: it can only raise the
question. But to the extent that the owner is not deprived of eco-
nomic use by the police power regulation, then the less the likeli-
hood that a taking will occur. Accordingly, as the Court did in this
case, courts must grant deference to legislative declarations, if
those declarations are made in good faith and if the effect on the
owner is not drastic. On the other hand, if the purpose of the law is
simply to transfer rights from private ownership to public use,
then compensation must be paid.
Normally a legislative judgment of wealth maximization will be
made in good faith. This is the assumption underlying the famous
footnote in United States v. Carolene Products Co.,7O which
reserves strict scrutiny for individuals such as racial minorities
which are not adequately represented in the political process. The
political theory articulated is that the producer groups likely to be
restricted actually have inordinate political power, since they have
a great interest in preventing the police power restriction. On the
other hand, individuals have few incentives to impose the restric-
tion. Hence, whereas producer groups will expend money, time,
and energy to prevent regulation, no single individual would have
the same incentive, since the loss is diffused over the public at
large.
This political theory is certainly valid in environmental law
where manufacturers and laborers are within the political jurisdic-
tion. The theory is not valid, however, where the person to be reg-
ulated is not represented in the body promulgating the regulation.
In the latter case, the community decision does not necessarily
represent a balancing of costs and benefits nor a decision for
wealth maximization, but the decision is simply a balancing of
costs and benefits among the groups represented in the body mak-
ing decision. In such a case, the fact that the body is elected does
not ensure a fair balancing but is likely instead to ensure an unfair
balancing of interests. Hence, a court may not treat the legislative
decision as conclusive or as presumptively valid if the effect of the
70. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). "There may be narrower scope for operation of the pre-
sumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be
within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten
amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced
within the Fourteenth." Id. at 152 n.4.
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decision is to impose the costs on persons not represented and to
reserve the benefits for persons represented. 71
Another aspect of the police power involves its essential func-
tion. It is clear that matters affecting the public must be decided
by the public. Courts have no business reviewing those decisions
even when the public body is uninformed or ill-advised. If a legis-
lative body determines in good faith that the community as a
whole would benefit from particular legislation, it ill behooves a
court to disagree, since the legislature, not the court, is elected to
make such decisions. In this area of law, courts may properly di-
rect litigants who object to such legislation to vote differently in
the next election. The issue for the court is not the wisdom of the
legislation, but whether the legislation is a cover for powers pro-
hibited to the legislature. As mentioned above, the prohibited
power relates to the law declaration function which is subject to
the particular prohibitions of the contracts clause, the equal pro-
tection clause, and the taking clause.
With regard to police power regulation, the nature of judicial
review is as follows: if the real purpose of a regulation is to trans-
fer property rights from one person to another, then the court
should invalidate the regulation as violative of the contracts
clause.72 Similarly, if the real purpose of the regulation is to estab-
lish a special status, then the law should be invalidated as violative
of the equal protection clause.7 3 Finally, if the real purpose of a
police power regulation is to transfer private property to public
use, then either the law must be invalidated or just compensation
must be paid.74 The problem is simple when the illegal purpose is
clear; however, difficult problems arise when a legitimate police
power purpose coincides with an effective transfer of property or
the creation of a status. In these instances, the courts must use
strict scrutiny ,in reviewing the means employed under the police
power. The most obvious examples of this problem occur in affirm-
ative action cases such as Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke.75 In Bakke, the police problem was perceived as the need
to make up for societal discrimination in the past and to assure
that an adequate number of minority doctors would be available in
the community. Utilizing the status approach would have resulted
in fixed quotas in violation of the equal protection clause. But by
71. The most obvious exercise of this power occurs when a court strikes down a
state statute which imposes an undue burden on interstate commerce. See,
e.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
72. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
73. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
74. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
75. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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establishing goals, the decision-maker could strive for a legitimate
end, and the possibility of establishing a status arrangement was
curtailed. As Justice Blackmun pointed out, the need for goals
arose out of particular problems and the legitimacy of the goals
would disappear as the problems disappeared. The means chosen
had to be precisely tailored to the extent of the problem. Thus, the
establishment of goals in affirmative action cases is similar to aid
to disaster victims or aid to infant industries. In each case, the
special treatment of a group of individuals is justified only to the
extent that it is required by the special circumstances.
The final police power issue is its relationship to freedom of
speech and freedom of the press. At the time of the drafting of the
Constitution, the police power had been used as much in sup-
pressing expression and enforcing religious moral standards as in
dealing with legitimate societal problems. Hamilton stated that
the first amendment was unnecessary in light of the powers
granted to the government.76 Even today, the language of the first
amendment presents difficulties when dealing with the receipt of
information as opposed to the giving of information.7 7
Although the first amendment attempted to articulate a particu-
lar value found within the nature of the government established by
the Constitution, the first amendment is neither the source of this
value nor its full explanation. The explanation of the restriction on
the government's authority to use its power to restrict information
arises out of the concept of popular sovereignty and the fact that
the government is a servant and agent of the people rather than a
governor of the people. Thus, if one imagined that the people were
king, could this king's ministers by right of law restrict either his
access to information or his authority to speak to his subjects?
Since law emanates from the sovereign and expresses his will, in-
formation necessary for the formation of that will must certainly
be free from control by some lesser power.
Another analogy may help to clarify the problem. Persons com-
pelled to testify before congressional hearings or court proceed-
ings have the right, even the duty, to fully express their positions.78
Furthermore, all communications to these authorities are privi-
76. THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
77. Board of Educ. Island Trees v. Pico, 102 S. Ct. 2799 (1982) where Chief Justice
Burger wrote in dissent: "Despite this absence of any direct external control
on the students' ability to express themselves, the plurality suggest that
there is a new First Amendment 'entitlement' to have access to particular
books in a school library." Id. at 2818. The right to receive information was
denied in United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) and affirmed in
both Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) and Richmond News-
papers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
78. Thus, when one is called to testify before a court or congressional committee,
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leged. If the agents of a sovereign principal have the right to re-
ceive information, obviously the principal also has the right to
receive information. This logic is valid as long as the principal is
the citizenry; however, it fails when the agents become governors
for the benefit of the community. In such a situation, the gover-
nors may reasonably decide that the people are not ready for par-
ticular types of information or that permitting certain criticism will
upset the people. 79 If one accepts the concept of the people as sov-
ereign and as the principal in this government, then the agents
(i.e., the governing bodies) have no right to make substantive rules
concerning the nature and kinds of information that the principal
may receive. The result is that time, place, and manner may be
regulated in order to ensure the orderly dissemination of informa-
tion.80 However, such regulations may not deal with substance.8 1
These police restrictions relate not only to political matters but
to the arts as well. Unquestionably, artists bring to the world new
ways of perceiving good and evil in the human condition.82 Hence,
restrictions on their activity is prohibited. But the activity pro-
tected does not include obscenity and pornography. By definition,
neither obscenity nor pornography seeks to convey truths about
the human condition, and as such may be banned.83 The problem
he must give all relevant information unless he can claim a privilege such as
self-incrimination or state secrets.
79. See generally C. CONE, THE ENGLISH JACOBINS (1968).
80. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23
(1968).
81. Time, place, and manner restrictions apply in other areas of law. For exam-
ple, a restriction on trading in wheat was upheld in Chicago Board of Trade v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918), on a finding that the restriction increased
the marketability of wheat. Accordingly, a restriction on speech which in fact
increased its chance of dissemination would be upheld. See, e.g., H. ROBERT,
ROBERT'S RULES OF ORDER (1970).
82. J. JOYCE, ULYSSES (1961). In his novel, Joyce used Freudian insights concern-
ing the existence of the subconscious mind and the sexuality of human na-
ture. Those insights could not be denied the public even though they might
offend the sensibilities of a majority of the people.
83. This distinction forms the basis of the Court's local standard rule. The rule
assures that the particular performance, gesture, object, or writing is not in-
tended to communicate information to the people as sovereign so that the
people can make decisions but only an attempt to divert or entertain. In the
latter situation, whether such diversion or entertainment violates a particular
community standard of decency is for the community to decide. To illustrate
the problem, assume that a manufacturer invented a machine that through
electrical impulses could stimulate a person to sexual climax. Could the first
amendment be grounds for prohibiting or regulating the sale and distribution
of such product? Performances, goods, writings, and so forth, which are
designed for the same purpose, should be subject to regulation, since in most
cases such activities would more likely be viewed or distributed in public
rather than in private.
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then is not the banning of obscenity and pornography, but distin-
guishing them from acceptable forms of communication. Since ob-
jective criteria, such as nudity, may be equally present in both art
and pornography, one must consider the work as a whole. That is
the purpose of the Court's determination that a work cannot be
banned if reasonable men believe that the work has artistic
merit.84 Only after a negative decision on that issue are jurors al-
lowed to determine whether the work is pornographic.85 Thus, ju-
rors cannot ban either political or artistic communication but only
works that have no merit.86
III. THE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS POWER
Two basic limitations on the governmental operations power
exist. First, the government may not arbitrarily discriminate be-
tween one citizen and another, and second, the government must
follow rational procedures in making decisions. Although limita-
tions on governmental operations are not exceptional, enforce-
ment of these limitations requires consideration of how and why
84. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
85. The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be:
(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary standards'
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest,. . . (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable
state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. (citations omitted).
Id. at 24.
86. The basic distinction, then, is between works which attempt to communicate
ideas and those directed solely to the senses. If objective standards are used,
many works that are protected by the first amendment would be prohibited,
whereas if a subjective standard is used, a reasonable person could not draw
a distinction between criminal and noncriminal activity. Because of this di-
lemma, other means of suppression are used such as actions against the play,
book, or movie itself, rather than actions against the persons in control. The
problem, of course, is that without the criminal law, there is no deterrence,
and the purveyors of the material can outlast the enforcers.
The distinction made in Miller v. California may be workable in a non-
criminal context, but as Justice Douglas pointed out in his dissent, it is diffi-
cult if not impossible to define criminal activity in objective terms and not
"chill" serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific work. Conversely, to
permit serious works while at the same time banning those works which
merely assume the guise of serious achievement in order to gain protection is
an impossible task. The solution lies in eschewing the criminal law so that no
chilling occurs and dealing instead with the particular work. This approach is
difficult since suppression by this method may be too expensive for local gov-
ernments in light of the large profits from selling such material. The better
approach may be zoning, as suggested in Young v. American Mini Theatres,
427 U.S. 50 (1976). Under the Young approach, objective standards are used
to regulate the time, place, and manner for display of the materials, but no
attempt is made to determine whether in fact the materials are obscene.
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they exist as well as how these limitations interrelate in the devel-
oped law of governmental operations. For the purposes of this Ar-
ticle, governmental operations includes all of the internal
operations of government such as hiring, firing, and contracting.
Governmental operations also includes the management of gov-
ernment lands, disposal of governmental property, operation of
services, and the distribution of benefits. In addition to a general
legislative authority, the Constitution gives Congress all of the
management powers listed in article I, section 8.87 Moreover, state
and local governments operate schools, hospitals, power compa-
nies, and the like for the benefit of the public.8 8 All of these activi-
ties are subject to specific rules and regulations and must be
operated for the benefit of the public.
Implicit in the concept of "public" office is the understanding
that the office should be used to promote public rather than private
interests. For example, a public office cannot be a reward to an
official for services rendered to the sovereign.8 9 If a public office
cannot be used as a reward, some rational standard is needed to
operate it.
In staffing a public office, a public official must not, unless spe-
cifically directed by law, consider any attributes of an applicant
other than those which would enable him to do the job better than
another applicant. The fiduciary duty of the public official to the
citizens requires that the official make rational decisions in ad-
ministering his office.
The standard for behavior of the government official is never in
question. He may not run his office for his own benefit,90 for the
87. General legislative authority is granted by article I, section 1. A good many of
the remaining powers are executive powers which historically had been part
of the King's prerogative. See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *237-80.
Specifically, the King's prerogative included the coining of money, making
war and peace, and marque and reprisal.
88. State and local governments have a virtual monopoly on primary and secon-
dary education as well as a substantial, if not dominant, share of higher
education.
89. The Case of Monopolies, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B. 1602). In rejecting the grant,
the court said: "[T] he Queen was deceived in her grant; for the Queen, as by
the preamble appears, intended it to be for the weal public, and it will be
employed for the private gain of the patentee, and for the prejudice of the
weal public. . . ." Id. at 1264 (footnote omitted). Implicit in this reasoning is
the understanding that no monopoly would be granted for private good only.
Interestingly, the only explicit authority in the Constitution to grant monop-
oly power is vested in Congress by article 1, section 8, and that power is lim-
ited both as to subject matter and duration. Certainly an inference can be
drawn that like the Queen, Congress can grant monopolies only to advance
the public good and not solely to benefit a private interest.
90. See Sloss v. Turner, 175 Ark. 994, 1 S.W.2d 993 (1928); Pacific Finance Corp. v.
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benefit of the political party selecting him,9 1 or for the benefit of
particular private groups who support him.92 However, the ques-
tion arises as to whether the government official's decisions are
subject to review, and if so, by what standard. One may say that
government officials may not act arbitrarily or capriciously. 93 The
converse is that they must act rationally.9 4
In the private sector, to act rationally means that before making
a decision, one must conduct an investigation and consider only
relevant information. The minimum requirements of the business
judgment rule as applied to corporate officials applies to govern-
ment officials as well. 95 Thus, in government employment, the gov-
ernment official may not prefer one person over another unless he
can design rational, job-related criteria to use in rank ordering
employees.9 6
When the decision results in a discharge from employment, the
standard to be used depends upon whether a prior determination
had disclosed whether the employee was competent. This distinc-
tion is exemplified by the Roth-Sindermann dichotomy.9 7 In Board
of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth,98 a teacher's one-year contract
was not renewed for the following academic year. Although he had
City of Lynwood, 114 Cal. App. 509, 1 P.2d 520 (1931). City of Miami v. Benson,
63 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 1953).
91. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
92. See Tuscan v. Smith, 130 Me. 36, 153 A. 289 (1931).
93. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976). "The reviewing court shall... (2) hold unlaw-
ful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accord-
ance with law. .. ." Id.
94. See United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prod. Corp., 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977).
"It is not in keeping with the rational process to leave vital questions, raised
by comments which are of cogent materiality, completely unanswered." Id.
at 252.
95. The Business Judgment Rule is articulated in THE PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 4.01(d) (tentative draft no. 1 1982).
96. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
These opinions are written in terms of the first amendment solely because
the concept of limitations on governmental power is inadequate. They are
better explained on the theory that a governmental office is an office of trust
and that governmental decisions must be based on a legitimate governmental
policy rather than on a claim that governmental policy infringes one's right of
association. If the right of association were the real issue, Republicans could
be required to dismiss Democrats from nonpolicy positions. State action is
not fully determinative of first amendment rights. See, e.g., New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (restructuring private actions under the
state tort law).
97. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
98. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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been given timely notice, Roth claimed that he was entitled to a
hearing at which the Wisconsin State University-Oshkosh officials
would have to give reasons for not renewing the contract. As the
Court pointed out, Roth had a contractual right for only one year.
In order to require a hearing, it was necessary for the Court to find
a "property interest," which could be done only if Roth's position
was a permanent one. In the private sector, when a job is "perma-
nent," a probationary period usually exists during which time the
employer may decide that he does not want to retain the em-
ployee. 99 Similarly, the issue in Roth was whether a governmental
employer had the right to decide whether a probationary employee
was competent to become a permanent employee. A court can
never assume that prerogative, since it belongs exclusively to the
management of the enterprise.OO
In Roth's case, the department had recommended his rehiring
notwithstanding his radical positions. Hence, the failure to rehire
Roth might have been due to his exercise of his first amendment
rights. Failure to grant Roth a hearing, however, did not foreclose
rehiring him if he could have proved that the failure to do so was
not an implied management decision but rather a reprisal for the
exercise of his first amendment rights. The effect of the Court's
decision on subsequent probationary cases is to put the burden of
proof on the employee to show improper behavior. The fact that
Roth's nonretention was against the recommendation of his imme-
diate supervisors, that he was one of only four who were not re-
tained, and that the termination recommendation came from the
board rather than the staff, were powerful arguments to support
his position.10 1
By contrast, in Perry v. Sindermann,l0 2 the Court felt free to
require the college to justify the termination of Sindermann.
While in the Texas state college system, Sindermann had been re-
hired for ten years. No hint of incompetence appeared in his file
nor was there any record of misbehavior on his part. The Court
could have found that the college had made a de facto determina-
tion that Sindermann had met the standards for a permanent em-
ployee. Once that determination was made, it would have been
appropriate to require management to give legitimate reasons for
termination and to allow the employee to test both the legitimacy
99. The usual union contract provides for a probationary period during which the
employer may terminate without cause. See F. ELKouRi & E. ELKouRi, How
ARBITRATION WORKS 613 (3d ed. 1973); M. STONE, LABOR MANAGEMENT CON-
TRACTS AT WORK, 261 (1961).
100. Joy Mfg. Co., 6 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 430, 436 (1946) (Healy, Arb.); Flintkote Co., 3
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 770, 771 (1946) (Cole, Arb.).
101. Board of Educ., Island Trees v. Pico, 102 S. Ct. 2799, 2811-12 (1982).
102. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
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of those reasons and their factual underpinnings. The existence of
a handbook describing employees such as Sindermann as perma-
nent employees merely stated the arrangement: after a reasonable
probationary period, the management considered an employee to
be permanent. To require that public supervisors who decide
whether to terminate employees may do so only after a proper in-
vestigation is both reasonable and rational. Furthermore, where
the claim is misconduct or incompetence, a hearing must be held
to determine accurately the truth or falsity of such charges. What
has been traditionally called a "due process" hearing is appropri-
ately designed for such a purpose.
The problems in this area have been compounded by the em-
phasis on the rights of the individual rather than the functional
actions of the government managers. The reason for this confu-
sion may be attributed to the methods courts have used to review
governmental actions. Originally, courts took the position that ac-
tions of government agents were not reviewable unless those ac-
tions interfered with existing private rights. In Tennessee Electric
Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority,1o3 the Court established
the standard necessary for obtaining standing to object to the ac-
tions of government by stating:
The appellants invoke the doctrine that one threatened with direct and
special injury by the act of an agent of the government which, but for stat-
utory authority for its performance, would be a violation of his legal rights,
may challenge the validity of the statute in a suit against the agent. The
principal is without application unless the right invaded is a legal right,-
one of property, one arising out of contract, one protected against tortious
invasion, or one founded on a statute which confers a privilege.
10 4
In effect, this ruling limited judicial review to police power
cases. Furthermore, it left governmental operations unreviewable
unless review was specifically authorized by statute. Tennessee
Electric did not affect cases in which the issue was whether a gov-
ernment agent had authority to act. Whether an agent had author-
ity was always either implicitly or explicitly subject to review in
order to ensure that the agents remained true to their legislated
purpose and used their governmental authority for public rather
than private gain. In England, the controlling concept was called
natural justice.105 Natural justice required a hearing whenever
factual disputes arose or when government agents exercised dis-
cretion based upon legal standards. In the United States, the con-
cept was encapsulated in the theory that government agents could
not be arbitrary or capricious and that a decision reached after a
hearing must be based upon substantial evidence.
103. 306 U.S. 118 (1939).
104. Id. at 137-38 (footnote omitted).
105. See T. HARTLEY & J. GRu=i, GovERNMENT AND LAW, 321-42 (1975).
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The general expectation that the government will not be arbi-
trary or capricious exerted pressure on courts to require that gov-
ernment agents justify their actions where no statute required
justification. To accomplish that end, the most obvious tool avail-
able to the judiciary already existed in the more familiar area of
police power law. Because police power imposed restrictions on
private rights for the benefit of the community, the police power
assumed the existence of underlying private rights. Governmental
operations, however, do not easily fit that mold, because one of the
basic reasons for reviewing governmental actions does not apply in
the private sector. In the private sector, the assumption is that the
person acting is a principal rather than an agent, and as such, has
full discretion to manage his affairs.
Conversely, government agents are more like corporate officers
and directors whose only obligation is to satisfy stockholders. Cor-
porate officers and directors do not owe a duty to employees, sup-
pliers, or customers, except were the private entity is also a public
utility or common carrier. Hence, to analogize the restrictions on
governmental operations to restrictions on the police power is use-
less where the government's decision is managerial rather than
one which indirectly accomplishes a police power purpose. On the
other hand, courts clearly had a duty to ensure that acts alleged to
be governmental operations were not a cover for attempts to ac-
complish police power objectives prohibited by the Constitution.
Beginning with Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Committee v. Mc-
Grath10 6 through the security clearance cases, 07 the Court has ex-
amined governmental operations to ensure that the government's
true purpose was not to limit political discussion and association
and that the effect of the government's actions was limited to what
was necessary to ensure the security of the United States. After
Tennessee Electric, ' 0 8 however, the only way that courts could
grant standing to hear such cases was to find a constitutional right
in the employee. Hence, it was necessary to expand the definition
of "property" to include job security, entitlements, and expecta-
tions. This expanded definition of property is easier to accomplish
when federal sovereign immunity prevents private tort or contract
actions and when actions against government officials are re-
stricted such as in Gregoire v. Biddle 109 and Barr v. Mateo.110
Nonetheless, an emphasis on "property rights" forced courts
106. 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
107. See, e.g., Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); Wolff v. Selective Service
Local Bd. No. 16, 372 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967).
108. 306 U.S. 118 (1939).
109. 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949).
110. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
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either to straight-jacket managerial decisions into situations where
the managers were required to have elaborate formal hearings or
to hold that the injured interest was not a property interest; and
therefore, the action that eliminated the interest was not unrea-
sonable. One solution to this problem was to define due process in
terms of what process was due. Thus, in Mathews v. Eldridge,"'
the Court held that no prior hearing was required to terminate so-
cial security disability payments if the method used was reason-
ably accurate and if appellate procedures were available. In so
holding, the Court actually articulated the rational decision-maker
standard.
To discuss government employment as a property interest is
useless. Employment essentially is a contract right. In the private
sector, one does not have a right to a job; therefore employees
serve at the pleasure of the employer, even if the contract is for a
"permanent" position or is for a substantial period of time. As a
result, the proper remedy for an employee who has been dis-
charged is to seek damages and not specific performance of the
employment contract." 2 On the other hand, any employee, as well
as any citizen, can expect from his government what he cannot ex-
pect from society in general: he can expect to be treated equally
and rationally.
As the level of responsibility rises, finer distinctions must be
made by government agents in carrying out their duties. However,
those agents may not give way to their personal preferences if
such preferences violate the stated policies of the government. Al-
though no one is entitled to a government job,113 no one can be
barred from consideration unless he is not capable of doing .the
job. Hence, all applicants must be considered. Because equally
qualified persons may apply, the government agent must make a
determination which will be final, absent evidence of improper no-
tice or of illegal consideration." 4
111. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
112. A good example is Sarokhan v. Fair Lawn Memorial Hosp., Inc., 83 N.J. Super.
127, 199 A.2d 52 (1964), where the court allowed a hospital to terminate a ten-
year irrevocable agreement and required the medical director to sue for dam-
ages rather than reinstatement. See also RESTATEMENT (SECO D) OF AGENCY
§ 138 (1957).
113. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). Justice Marshall stated in
his dissent: "In my view, every citizen who applies for a government job is
entitled to it unless the government can establish some reason for denying
the employment." Id. at 588 (Marshall, J., dissenting). If all Justice Marshall
really wished to say was that the prospective employee had a right to be con-
sidered equally with everyone else and that the decision had to be made on a
rational basis (i.e., an articulated basis rationally related to governmental
needs), then we would agree with him.
114. Federal Communications Comm'n v. Allentown Broadcasting Corp., 349 U.S.
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For a court to substitute its judgment for that of the govern-
ment agent would be improper, because the authority to hire was
granted to the agent and not to the court.115 The only issues for the
court to decide would be whether the criteria used was appropriate
or whether accusations of bias or improper notice were well
founded. Once a person was hired, however, a court could not de-
termine whether he was performing adequately. Although some
objective criteria exists, it is well-recognized that the decision be-
longs to the first level supervisor. And as long as his decision was
made in good faith, the courts have no business interfering with it.
In the case of a long retained employee, it is clear that a deter-
mination has been made that he is capable of doing the work. His
termination should result only from a failure to continue to per-
form at an established level. The supervisor wishing to replace the
permanent employee should be able to submit proof of the
changes in the employee's behavior. The sole function of the court
in such instances is to determine whether the standards allegedly
violated are reasonably related to job performance and whether
substantial evidence exists to support the alleged failure to per-
form.116 No hearing is required because an adequate remedy ex-
ists in the case of erroneous discharges. Furthermore, to require a
prior hearing would impinge upon management's prerogative."17
The issue of a post or prior hearing cannot be resolved by an
attempt to characterize the interest as a property interest. The
cost of a prior hearing must be balanced against the potential for
error and the remedies available at a subsequent hearing. In pri-
vate law, the general rule is that an irreparable loss must exist for
which a legal remedy is inadequate and that the injured party has
a probable chance of success. 118 If such a rule were applied in the
context of government employment, a prior hearing would not be
358 (1955). See also Allentown Broadcasting Corp. v. Federal Communica-
tions Comm'n, 232 F.2d 57 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1015 (1956);
Allentown Broadcasting Corp. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 222 F.2d
781 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (Judge Prettyman, dissenting).
115. The issue was raised most dramatically when Congress attempted to invest
the courts with broadcast licensing authority. The courts refused to take this
responsibilty because the question of who is entitled to a broadcast license is
an administrative rather than a judicial decision. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169,
§ 4, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927).
116. In collective bargaining agreements, the employer has a duty to impose pro-
gressive discipline.
117. Collective bargaining agreements and cases involving discharge from govern-
ment employment such as Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), recognize
that back pay and reinstatement are possible remedies. Only where the
rights are contractual is the party limited to contract damages. See supra
note 110.
118. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
[Vol. 63:84
CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION
necessary if post event hearings were mandatory. In government
entitlement cases, prior hearings would be unnecessary except in
extreme cases. A prior hearing would be required not because the
person had a property interest, but because of the potential for ir-
reparable harm resulting from a loss of the entitlement. Further-
more, it must be shown that such a hearing would have a probable
chance of success. 119
If courts would stop concentrating on property interests and fo-
cus instead on the government's duty to act rationally and fairly in
relationship to the particular objective sought, judicial review
would be much more consistent.
IV. THE LAW DECLARATION POWER
Law declaration is simply the defining of legal rights as be-
tween individuals. In traditional parlance, it is private law rather
than public law. Generally, the law declaration power is exercised
119. In Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. Federal Power Comm'n, 259 F.2d 921
(D.C. Cir. 1958), the court enumerated the factors that one must prove in or-
der to be entitled to a prior hearing-
(1) Has the petitioner made a strong showing that it is likely to
prevail on the merits of its appeal? Without such a substantial indi-
cation of probable success, there would be no justification for the
court's intrusion into the ordinary processes of administration and
judicial review. (2) Has the petitioner shown that without such re-
lief, it will be irreparably injured? The key word in this consideration
is irreparable. Mere injuries, however, substantial, in terms of
money, time and energy necessarily expended in the absence of a
stay, are not enough. The possibility that adequate compensatory or
other corrective relief will be available at a later date, in the ordinary
course of litigation, weighs heavily against a claim of irreparable
harm. But injury held insufficient to justify a stay in one case may
well be sufficient to justify it in another, where the applicant has
demonstrated a higher probability of success on the merits.
(3) Would the issuance of a stay substantially harm other parties in-
terested in the proceedings? On this side of the coin, we must deter-
mine whether, despite showings of probable success and irreparable
injury on the part of petitioner, the issuance of a stay would have a
serious adverse effect on other interested persons. Relief saving one
claimant from irreparable injury, at the expense of similar harm
caused another, might not qualify as the equitable judgment that a
stay represents. (4) Where lies the public interest? In litigation in-
volving the administration of regulatory statutes designed to pro-
mote the public interest, this factor necessarily becomes crucial. The
interests of private litigants must give way to the realization of public
purposes. The public interest may, of course, have many face-favor-
ing at once both the rapid expansion of utilities and the prevention of
wasteful and repetitive proceedings at the taxpayers' or consumers'
expense; both fostering competition and preserving the economic vi-
ability of existing public services; both expediting administrative or




by the courts according to the expectations of the community.
Conceiving limitations on the law declaration power is difficult be-
cause it defines rather than limits rights and duties. Thus, when
one complains in court that his rights have been infringed, he must
first know what those rights are. In a suit over the possession of
Blackacre, a decision that one individual rather than another has a
right to possession cannot be an infringement on personal rights.
The loser might claim that the decision was wrong, but within the
system, the decision was that he had no right to possession. In the
same manner, gambling contracts, contracts in restraint of trade,
and contracts for immoral behavior are not enforceable because no
rights have been infringed.
There are two distinct limitations on the law declaration power-
first, it should not defeat the reasonable expectations of the parties
by changing the definition of legal rights; and second, status should
not be used in determining legal rights. The first limitation is
found in the contracts clause, and the second limitation is found in
the equal protection clause.
In the course of litigation, some people will always be disap-
pointed by the decisions of the courts, especially when prior case
law is reversed. However, such changes are generally related to
remedial rather than primary duties and are usually justified in
terms of existing standards.12 0 This primary-remedial distinction
is usually maintained even when new legislation is involved and
even if the legislation is outcome determinative. Thus, new rules
of law, rules of evidence, and so forth are generally immediately
applied on the theory that a person's expectations on the proce-
dural or remedial side relate only to having a fair system rather
than having a particular system.121 When a contract is affected,
the result is different, because the parties have bargained on the
basis of known risks. A change in the law which affects those risks
strikes at the heart of the bargain. If the change were applied ret-
roactively, it would in fact result in a transfer of property from one
individual to another. Thus, legislative law declarations that trans-
fer risks between parties should be invalid when applied to ex-
isting contracts or legal arrangements, whereas they are valid
120. See H. HART & A. SACKS, LEGAL PROCESS 574, 576-77 (1958). The authors argue
that the purpose of remedial law is to effectuate enforcement of primary obli-
gations and hence should not be used to frustrate those obligations. See also
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
121. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence were
effective 180 days after adoption and applied to all cases then pending.
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965) applies to cases similar to Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) but illustrates the proposition that one has only




when applied to future arrangements. 22 Clearly, the reason for
this distinction is that future agreements can take into considera-
tion any new assignment of values and benefits.
This limitation on the law declaration power is based upon the
perceived unfairness to the contracting parties, not on the wisdom
of the new rules as they affect the community. The effect of the
law declaration on the community must be considered under the
police power. As such, it is unreviewable except when it exceeds
its jurisdictional basis. When the legislature declares that certain
controls are illegal and unenforceable, 23 a court cannot question
the wisdom of the legislative conclusions. Instead, judicial review
should be limited to the question of whether such contracts are
enforceable at the expense of one individual while reaping benefits
for another. If the law operates prospectively, however, the latter
condition cannot exist, since both parties to the contract can adjust
their terms to reflect the changed conditions. This is true, for ex-
ample, in minimum wage contracts, because the employer can de-
cide not to enter into the contract at all. He is never required to
pay for more than he bargained.
Analyzed in this fashion, the Lochner line of cases 24 is clearly
wrong. In Lochner, Justice Peckham assumed that legislatures
had no right to modify the law of contracts even when the modifi-
cation would not involve any restrictions on existing contract
rights. In Lochner, as well as in Coppage v. Kansas, 25 and Adkins
v. Children's Hospital,126 vested rights were not disturbed; rather,
the right to contract in the future was simply curtailed.27 Such
122. In Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 reh'g. denied, 439 U.S.
886 (1978), and United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977), an
involuntary transfer of interests occurred which was similar to the one that
was prohibited in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
123. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Coppage v. Kan-
sas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). In Coppage,
Lochner, and Adkins, the Court struck down legislation that took away, with-
out due process, the liberty to contract in the future. The Court assumed that
the general public policy which favored free contracting among consenting
adults was a constitutional right which could be limited only by public neces-
sity and which was, therefore, subject to independent judicial scrutiny. The
fact was, however, that none of these statutes impaired existing contracts and
hence could not have advantaged over contracting party over another.
124. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
125. 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
126. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
127. The law of contracts permits restrictions on the right to contract. See, e.g.,
Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224 (1892).
It is impossible to define with accuracy what is meant by that public
policy for an inference and violation of which a contract may be de-
clared invalid. It may be understood in general that contracts which
are detrimental to the interests of the public as understood at the
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restrictions are no different from other restrictions imposed by
courts on the ability to contract. The only possible distinction that
can be drawn is that the Court approved of previous judicial re-
strictions or felt bound by them and did not feel bound by current
legislative declarations.
The differences between the police power and the law declara-
tion power can be further illuminated by examining Home Build-
ing & Loan Association v. Blaisdell128 and Allied Structural Steel
v. Spannaus.129 In Blaisdell, the Minnesota legislature had passed
a statute which provided that during certain emergencies, courts
could not allow foreclosure on farms when the owners had failed to
meet mortgage payments. On the surface, the law declaration ap-
pears to be a transfer of rights from debtors to creditors. However,
closer analysis reveals that the legislation was a proper use of the
police power rather than an attempt to change legitimate expecta-
tions, because the power was limited to an emergency and did not
change the obligation of the parties as to the amount of the debt or
the interest due. Furthermore, the law simply did what any court
could have done: it merely delayed the date of foreclosure. The
effect of the act was to make economic conditions relevant to the
question of whether foreclosures should proceed. The legislature
determined that allowing foreclosures in a depressed market
would have two adverse consequences: first, it would harm debt-
ors by cutting off their equity interest in the farm; and second, it
would destroy market values of land with the result that creditors
would also be adversely affected. Reasonable persons could easily
come to the conclusion that temporarily halting foreclosures in a
depressed market would be wealth enhancing for the total
community.
Allied Structural Steel, on the other hand, involved the rewrit-
ing of an existing pension arrangement between workers and their
employer. To the extent that the companies were made responsi-
time fall within the ban. The standard of such policy is not abso-
lutely invariable or fixed, since contracts which at one stage of our
civilization may seem to conflict with public interests, at a more ad-
vanced stage are treated as legal and binding.
Id. at 233-34. See also United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271
(6th Cir. 1898), modified and affd., 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (contracts in restraint
of trade); Anderson v. Branstrom, 173 Mich. 157, 139 N.W. 40 (1912) (contracts
tending to corrupt or to cause a neglect of duty; agreement of a prosecutor to
divide his salary with his law partner); R. Thackoorseydass v. Soojumnull
Dhondmull, 13 Eng. Rep. 699 (P.C. 1848) (wagers and gaming contracts);
U.C.C. § 2-302 (1978) (Unconscionable Contracts or Clause); Winfield, The
History of Maintenance and Champetry, 35 L.R. 50 (1919) (contracts ad-
versely affecting the administration of justice).
128. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
129. 438 U.S. 234, reh'g. denied, 439 U.S. 886 (1978).
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ble to the workers for their pension contributions, the law proba-
bly could have been upheld as a legitimate declaration of rights in
a pension corpus. On the other hand, the act placed additional
financial burdens on the companies for the benefit of workers. It
destroyed the reasonable expectations of the companies and as a
result violated the contracts clause.
Using the approach outlined in this Article, nonemergency
price controls on housing would not be allowed on the basis that
such controls simply transferred property rights from owners to
tenants. Originally, price controls on housing were justified on the
theory that during an emergency landlords would raise prices. In
turn, the market would not be able to respond by increasing the
supply. Price controls were perceived as necessary to prevent
landlords from exploiting shortages during emergencies. The re-
sult of rent controls during emergency situations, however, is to
transfer property from landlords to tenants. One could argue from
a policy point of view that rent control is not wealth enhancing.
However, that issue is for the legislature to determine. Undenia-
bly, the transfer is from the existing landlord to the existing ten-
ants. Rent control, therefore, impairs contract rights because it
imposes terms that the parties would not have chosen for them-
selves. The effect differs from minimum wage requirements in
that the employer need not enter the contract if it is not profitable.
By contrast, the landlord can avoid the contract only by aban-
doning beneficial use of his property. However, regulations impos-
ing rent control on new property could be justified because
investors would be able to make investment decisions based on
current price regulators. This result is no different from the situa-
tion facing employers who hire under existing minimum wage re-
quirements, since in both cases the decision maker has the
alternative of not engaging in the regulated activity. Clearly, there
are few differences between these regulations, which have gener-
ally been upheld, and those that were prohibited in Allied Struc-
tural Steel.130 The wartime price controls are similar to the
Blaisdell moratorium and could be justified on the same basis as
the police power regulation which was justified in Blaisdell.131
130. To carry the argument further, the requirement in Allied Structural Steel Co.
v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, reh'g. denied, 439 U.S. 886 (1978), of an additional
payment not contracted for is the functional equivalent in a nonemergency
rent control situation of a release from paying a price that would have been
contracted "but for" the legislation.
131. Wartime rent controls and the delay of foreclosures are the opposite ends of
market failure. In the former, the market cannot adjust because new goods
cannot be produced to meet new demands, while in a depression, lack of li-
quidity from a diminished money supply effectively prevents demand from
offering fair prices in foreclosure proceedings.
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The other major restriction on the law declaration power is a
prohibition against recognizing status. The inscription over many
a courthouse door phrases that prohibition as "Equality before the
law." This notion lies at the core of republican secular government
under which no one is to receive privileges or suffer disabilities
based upon his birth or religion. Accordingly, the Constitution for-
bids the granting of nobility, the establishment of an aristocracy,
or the establishment of a religion. Moreover, the elimination of a
monarchy in and of itself established the principle that the law
should apply to all responsible members of society. The common
law and English statutes, however, excluded many persons from
equal status. Paupers and vagrants, 132 illegitimates,133 and non-
property owners were treated differently.134 Incompetents, lunat-
ics, and retarded persons also had a special status.135 Non-
Christians,136 Catholics,137 and atheists138 were excluded from the
132. 1 C. STEPHENSON & F. MARCHAM, sUpra note 16, at 313-14, 356-58 (reference to
Beggars Act (1536), Statutes of the Realm 111, 558 f.: 27 Henry VIII, c. 25; Poor
Relief Act (1598), Statutes of the Realm, IV, 896 f.: 39 Elizabeth, c. 3).
133. In Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968), the Court struck down a statute that
gave a lesser status to illegitimates. Such statutes were derived from the bib-
lical requirement that illegitimates inherit only through the mother.
134. In 1430, Parliament enacted a statute limiting country franchises to men who
owned land to the clear and respectable annual value of 40 shillings. 8 Henry
VI, c. 7. This statute, and especially its preamble, proclaimed one of the great
assumptions of English society: property, particularly land, and political lit-
eracy are indissoluably joined. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, =spra note 16, at *172.
135. In re Leonard's Estate, 95 Mich. 295, 54 N.W. 1082 (1893).
136. From the beginning, Jews were excluded from full citizen's rights. A good
example appears in The Assize of Arms, item 7 (1181): "[No] Jew shall keep
in his possession a shirt of mail or a hauberk, but he shall sell it or give it
away or alienate it in some other way, so that it shall remain in the king's
service." By contrast, item 2 declares: "Moreover, every free layman who
possesses chattels or rents to the value of 16m. shall have a shirt of mail, a
helmet, a shield, and a lance; and every free layman possessing chattels or
rents to the value of 10m. shall have a hauberk, an iron cap, and a lance." 1 C.
STEPHENSON & F. MARcH.m, supra note 16, at 85-86. Jewish parents were also
required to support any of their children who converted to Protestantism. 1
W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *449 (reference to Stat. 11 and 12, Will. III,
c. 4 & 1 Ann. St. 1, c. 30).
137. In order to hold an office of honor or trust, one was required to swear.
I, A. B., do swear that I do from my heart abhor, detest, and abjure as
impious and heretical this damnable doctrine and position, that
princes excommunicated or deprived by the pope or any authority of
the sea of Rome may be deposed or murdered by their subjects or
any other whatsoever. And I do declare that no foreign prince, per-
son, prelate, state, or potentate hath or ought to have any jurisdic-
tion, power, superiority, preeminence, or authority ecclesiastical or
spiritual within this realm. So help me God.
2 C. STEPHENSON & F. MARCHAm, supra note 16, at 602 (reference to Bill of
Rights (1689). Statutes of the Realm, VI 142 f.: I William & Mary, St. 2).
138. 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1828, 414 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1976) "Until 1800's,
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society. Convicts,139 whether incarcerated or not, Indians,140
Blacks,141 Asians,142 aliens, and nonresidents also had a different
status,143 while women and children were assumed to be
dependent.144
Throughout the history of constitutional law, a myriad of dis-
putes arose over who might receive the equal protection of the law.
Although the Constitution specifically forbade laws establishing a
religion, for many years atheists were prevented from testifying in
courts of law.145 And because the Constitution forbade the states
from discriminating against nonresidents in the application of the
public and private law, 46 Justice Taney felt obliged to hold that
Dred Scott 47 could not become a citizen of Illinois. He reasoned
that if Blacks could become citizens of free states, then as nonresi-
dent visitors to slave states they could not be treated differently
from the nonresident Whites. Such a result might have incited
slaves to demand better treatment.
The redeclaration of rights for all "classes" of individuals came
with the passage of the Civil Rights Act which provides that, "All
citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every
State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to in-
herit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property." 4 8 After passage of this Act and the equal protection
* * * the requirement was inexorable; with the result that three classes of per-
sons were absolutely excluded from testifying, namely, adults having an
atheistical belief, infants lacking any theological belief, and adults having the
requisite belief but forbidden by conscience to take an oath." See, e.g., Pum-
phrey v. State, 84 Neb. 636, 122 N.W. 19 (1909); Omichand v. Barker, 1 A.T.If
22, 45 (L.C.J. Willes required that a witness believe in God) discussed in 6 J.
WIGMORE, EVDENCE § 1815, 384 (Chadbourn rev. 1976); Atcheson v. Everett, 1
Coup. 382, 386 (1770).
139. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *172 (convicted perjurers could not vote).
Many states provide that conviction of a felony results in the loss of civil
rights. See, MODEL SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS ACT (1978). See also
Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967); 0. WILDE, LETTERS FROM READ-
ING GOAL (1948).
140. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 allows for the exclusion of Indians from both taxa-
tion and representation.
141. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
142. Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882), repealed by Act of Dec. 17,
1943, ch. 344, § 1, 57 Stat. 600 (1943).
143. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *162 (reference to 12 & 13 Will. III, c.2, 30
Car. II, st. 2, & 1 Geo. I, 13).
144. Id. at 447, 453, & 458.
145. In most jurisdictions, statutes now provide for affirmation by persons who
lack the requisite belief or have scruples against oaths. 6 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 138, at 429.
146. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (providing diversity jurisdiction).
147. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
148. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976).
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clause of the fourteenth amendment, the Court extended equal
treatment to all individuals by striking down statutes and common
law precedents which limited their rights.149 Where legislatures
sought to establish exceptions to that equality, courts strictly scru-
tinized the legislation in order to determine whether a legitimate
nexus existed between the status and a justifiable end or whether
the unequal treatment was instead a general deprivation of rights.
The "nexus" doctrine can best be illustrated by the treatment of
incarcerated convicts. Under this doctrine, the confined person
has all the rights of a free man except those necessarily curtailed
in order to carry out his punishment. The restrictions on his right
to communicate, hold property, carry on family relationships, and
to work must relate directly to the needs of the institution in which
he is confined and to the ability of the state to maintain discipline
in that institution.150 This treatment is a far cry from the doctrine
of civil death151 wherein the convict was considered a "slave" of
the state who had no rights and was subject to the uncontrolled
discretion of his jailer. 5 2 Paupers, vagrants, and addicts now re-
ceive similar treatment. 53
The "nexus" doctrine also applies to women and illegitimates.
For example, in Reed v. Reed,154 the legislative assumption behind
the disputed statute was that men were better able to handle busi-
ness than women. The Court properly held that women, as well as
men, could administer a decedent's estate. In Mississippi Univer-
sity for Women v. Hogan,155 however, the Court improperly ap-
plied the doctrine to a governmental operations case. Application
of the equal protection clause is mandatory in law declaration
cases but not in police power or governmental operations cases. 156
In the latter situations, the existence of the status or the category
may directly relate to a legitimate societal problem or government
service rather than establish a sanction or limitation on rights
based on status. In Hogan, the "women only" category directly re-
lated to the legitimate end of providing advanced education in a
one-sex setting. Substantial evidence supports the proposition
149. Holman v. Hilton, 542 F. Supp. 913 (D.N.J. 1982). The court struck down a
New Jersey law which prohibited prisoners from bringing actions against
public officials while the prisoners were incarcerated.
150. See Rudolph, supra note 64, at 535.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
154. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
155. 102 S. Ct. 3331 (1982).
156. Compare the duty under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 to ensure the equal enforcement of
private law, as exemplified by Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409
(1968), with the government need to draft men rather than women. Rostker
v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
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that students learn better in such a setting, and a legislature
should be able to establish one-sex colleges without fear of judicial
second-guessing. Similarly, a legislature could require that an ille-
gitimate child must prove that he was the child of a particular per-
son. However, once this was done he could not be treated
differently under the laws of inheritance. 5 7
The necessity for a nexus is clear in governmental operations
cases where the state seeks to limit employment on the basis that
certain jobs require special loyalty to the state.158 In such cases,
the function of the judiciary is strictly to scrutinize the evidence in
support of the nexus and invalidate laws that create status disabil-
ities not related to legitimate needs of the government.15 9
In the case of incompetents and infants, their vulnerable condi-
tion justifies the rule that except for necessities, they may not
make binding contracts in the marketplace.160 Similarly, in con-
sumer transactions, certain disclosures or time for reconsideration
of contracts are necessary. Other limitations on the ability to con-
tract exist; however, these limitations do not relate to status, but
rather to the superior bargaining position of one of the parties.
Again such limitations must be specifically tailored to the problem
involved.16 1
V. CONCLUSION
From the foregoing analysis of the powers granted to the gov-
ernment, one can see that courts should not substitute their judg-
ment for that of the legislative body. Rather, courts should insist
that the legislative body exercise its authority in good faith and for
an appropriate purpose. Thus, an exercise of the police power is
nonreviewable except against claims that the exercise is beyond
157. Compare Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) with Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259
(1978).
158. Compare cases in which the state may not discriminate against aliens such
as In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) and Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634
(1973), with Ambah v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
159. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
160. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 14, § 15 (1979); Mental Illness and
the Law of Contracts, 57 McH. L. REv. 1020 (1959).
161. As we have already pointed out, certain contracting parties receive special
protection. For example, a traveller on a common carrier cannot waive his
right to sue for negligence. See Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.)
358 (1873). Legislation such as the Uniform Commercial Code treats consum-
ers as protected persons. Furthermore, field workers cannot waive the pro-
tection of the Fair Labor Standards Act, of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060; see D. A.
Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108 (1946). In these instances, protection is
mandated because of a perceived inequality of bargaining power between in-
dividuals. In reality, the result is judicial control of one party law-making
rather than a limitation on the weaker party's capability to contract.
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the jurisdiction of a secular state based upon popular sovereignty;
that the exercise is for the purpose of transferring one individual's
property to another individual or to the public; or that the exercise
is either a method of discriminating against nonresidents or is a
cover for the economic regulatory power that belongs to the na-
tional government. The issue in each instance is judicially deter-
minable and is no different than the issues that arise in private law
concerning the power of corporate officers, agents, or trustees who
act for principals pursuant to delegated authority.
As discussed above, the same approach can be followed in law
declaration and governmental operations. In each area, the ques-
tions that arise are clearly judicial rather than managerial in na-
ture. Furthermore, they do not involve policy considerations other
than a fair understanding of the general purposes of the Constitu-
tion and the concept that the powers of government are delegated
for the benefit of the principal. Through the history of constitu-
tional interpretation, however, the latter concept has caused great
difficulty. The question has never been whether a particular state
of the union or the United States was created as an agent of the
community, but whether a judicial remedy was available under the
federal Constitution. Thus, it was held that the taking clause of
the fifth amendment was not applicable to the states, rather, the
only remedy was in state court.162
The misapplication in Barron v. Baltimore,163 for example, was
partly the result of looking at the prohibition rather than the
power. Clearly, individual contract rights were protected against
state action, and this in turn should have meant that property
rights were also protected. The upshot of the Court's analysis,
however, was that if the United States Constitution did not pro-
hibit a state from taking an individual's property without compen-
sation, then the state was in fact constitutionally authorized to do
so. Based upon this view of law, the concept evolved that state
constitutions were limitations on powers rather than grants of
power even though such a view was clearly contrary to the Ameri-
can experience. The fact was that the Constitution dealt with state
as well as federal power and the failure of courts to enforce consti-
tutional restrictions on the states concerning freedom of religion
led to the passage of the fourteenth amendment. The fourteenth
amendment was added to ensure not only that Blacks would not
be treated differently from Whites but also that restrictions on free
speech and religion tests common in the South before the War
would not be continued. 164 Moreover, under the privileges and im-
162. Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
163. Id.
164. See generally C. EATON, THE FREEDOM OF THOUGHT STRUGGLE IN THE OLD
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munities clause of the fourteenth amendment, all governments,
and not just the national government, were specified to be govern-
ments of limited powers which were to be used for particular, au-
thorized purposes. Using this approach, one can isolate the legal
issues to be resolved by the court.
SouTH (1964). Laws were passed prohibiting people from teaching slaves to
read or from employing them in printing offices. In 1835 a North Carolina
constitutional convention definitively disqualified Jews from holding office.
See Huhner, The Struggle for Religious Liberty In North Carolina, With Spe-
cial Reference To The Jews, 16 PUBLICATIONS OF THE AMERICAN JEWISH HIS-
TORICAL SociETY 37, 49-51 (1907).
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